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It is a pleasure to participate in this Man in Spate 
session of the Fourth National Cdnference on the 
Peaceful Uses of Space. Dr. Gilruth has given an 
excellent review of the origins of manned space 
flight, the Mercury program, and the beginning of the 
flight phase of the Gemini program earlier this month. 
The previous papers of this session have focused on 
the details of the Apollo program. Dr. Shea reported 
on the Apollo spacecraft, Dr. Rees discussed the 
Saturn launch vehicles, and Dr. Debus told of the 
plans and progress in the construction of the space 
port at the Kennedy Space Center. 
This paper summarizes the progress to date in the 
Apollo effort and reviews some overall Apollo con- J 
siderations and the benefits that the country will gain 
from Apollo. Figures 1 to &photographs and artists’ 
drawings of facilities at the Marshall Space Flight 
Center, Kennedy Space Center, and Mississippi Test 
Operations Site-are a progress report on filling the 
pipeline for the nationwide Apollo effort. 
FIGURE I.-Test area at Marshall Space Flight Center. 
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FIGURE 2.-Apollo spacecraft Fluid Test Complex at Kennedy Space Center (January 1964). 
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FIGURE 3.-Artist’s sketch of vertical assembly building area at Kennedy Space Center. 
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FIGURE 4.-Mississippi Test Operations Site plan. To be completed in 1966. 
Much progress has been made in the Apollo 
program (fig. 5 )  which can be truly said to have 
been started in 1958, the year that Congress passed 
the Space Act. It was in that year that work began 
on the Saturn I launch vehicle, the F-1 engine, and 
the Centaur program, in which this country pioneered 
in the use of liquid hydrogen as a rocket fuel. 
It was because of the progress of these efforts, as 
well as that in the Mercury program, that it was 
possible to broaden and accelerate our country's efforts 
in space (fig. 6 )  3 years ago this spring, and that 
President Kennedy could set as a national goal the 
beginning of manned lunar exploration in this decade. 
In recent months, we have carried out a series of 
reviews of the progress of development of the 
systems and subsystems within the overall Apollo 
system. We  could find no technological problems of 
such a major nature that they would interfere with the 
accomplishment of the program on schedule. Indeed, 
we could not find one that is not yielding to hard 
work. 
It appears that the most challenging technical task 
before us is the integration of all of the systems 
and subsvstemc-in making them all work properly 
together. The flight schedule, therefore, is laid out 
in a way calculated to permit carrying out this inte- 
gration as early as possible. 
We have also recently reviewed a number of 
matters related to the overall pace of Apollo. We  
have compared the Apollo pace with that of other 
major research and development programs carried out 
by the United States in the past. We have examined 
the impact on total cost of possible changes in the 
Apollo schedule; and we have studied the relation- 
ship between the pace and the conditions in the space 
environment. 
The overall time phasing, we found, is actually 
quite conservative. The Apollo spacecraft is being 
developed on a schedule 4 years longer than was 
needed for the Mercury spacecraft, and 2 years 
longer than was needed to produce the €3-58 bomber. 
The Saturn IB and Saturn V launch vehicles are 
being developed on a schedule 2 years longer than 
that of the Atlas missile, and 1 year longer than was 
required for the Titan. The total duration scheduled 
for the Apollo program is longer than that of any 
previous United States research and development 
effort. 
The Apollo job, of  course, is a big one, and we will 
need all of the time allotted. The number of parts, 
components, and subsystems is greater, and they must 
function for longer periods of time. But the problems 
lend themselves to orderly solutions; no new inven- 
tions or breakthroughs are required. We have gener- 
ated a high degree of momentum, and the work is 
going forward effectively and efficiently. 
Our recent reviews also examined how the pace 
affects total cost. In particular, we looked into the 
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effect on total cost that would be caused by a slowing
of the effort and a stretchout of the completion date
to the 1970's. This was done in great detail. We
studied, subsystem by subsystem, the resource require-
ments associated with the present schedules. To do
this, we analyzed thoroughly the requirements in man-
hours for the work to be done in engineering and
manufacturing. Then we added the costs of overhead
and the operating burden needed to support the work,
not only within the NASA organization but in those
of the contractors and subcontractors involved.
We found upon completion of the calculation_ that
v/ if the remaining 6 years of work were stretched out
over 12 years the total cost of the presently approved
manned space flight program would increase by about
30 percent, or about $6 billion. The economic con-
siderations, therefore, support the maintenance of the
present schedule. It is $6 billion cheaper to continue
on the course we are now following than to set out
on a new course at this late date.
Still another area of review of the Apollo pace was
v the effect of conditions in the space environment.
We looked into the matter of meteoroids in space.
We examined the effect of radiation in space, and
we studied the question of conditions on the Moon's
surface.
With respect to meteoroids, present knowledge
mainly originates in the data from the Explorer XVI
satellite launched by NASA on December 16, 1962,
and visual and radar ground observations of meteor
arrivals in the upper atmosphere. The results from
Explorer XVI indicate that the rate of puncture of
the Apollo spacecraft skin by meteoroids would be
considerably less than had been anticipated earlier
on the basis of indirect calculations from ground
observatlons.
Further meteoroid information wilt be obtained on
the 8th, 9th, and 10th flights of the Saturn I, which
we anticipate will provide confirmation of the Apollo
spacecraft design criteria. As additional data are
obtained, we will continue to review this matter very
carefully. However, it is not expected that meteoroizls
will constitute a major problem in the planning o,
scheduling of the first manned lunar exploration.
We reviewed the potential radiation hazard from
cosmic rays originating elsewhere in the galaxy,
charged partides trapped in the Van Allen radiation
belts, and high-energy particles ejected during solar
flares. The danger from the cosmic rays and the
Van Allen belts during typical Apollo missions is
negligible. Solar-flare protons are largely diverted by
the Earth's magnetic field and, therefore, do not
present a hazard in the Portion of the Apollo trajec-
tory below the belts. Therefore, the only portion of
the mission about which there is any need for detailed
solar-flare calculations is that part in which the space-
craft is in flight beyond the Van Allen belts.
The permissible safe limits for radiation are based
on a 1962 report of a working group set up by the
Man in Space Committee of the Space Science Board
of the National Academy of Sciences. The most im-
Portant limit recommended by this group is that of
100 rads as the maximum permissible dose received
by the blood-forming organs.
In our reviews, we looked into the dose that would
have been received within the command module by
astronauts on a normal Apollo mission if one had
taken place during a large solar flare. We found
that in the largest recorded flare, that of July 1959,
the dose to the blood-forming organs would have
been 15 rads. Thus, the worst flare known would
have given the astronauts only 15 percent of the
allowable safe dose.
Altogether, the evidence available indicates that ra-
diation does not present a hazard that would prevent
manned lunar exploration in this decade. In fact, we
have encountered no serious evidence that would in-
dicate that radiation would be a factor in scheduling
the first lunar mission.
The third environmental matter reviewed was the
selection of the lunar-landing site. Present informa-
tion on the surface of the Moon is based on observa-
tions from Earth, analysis of radar echoes, analysis of
the rate of arrival of meteors, and analogies to Earth.
Study of this information indicates that it will be
Possible to find many suitable sites for landings on the
Moon. The landing gear of the lunar excursion
module (LEM) is being designed to cope with a wide
variety of possible surface conditions, and the LEM
is capable of lateral flight so that a satisfactory land-
ing site can be chosen by the astronauts.
We anticipate that further information regarding
conditions on the Moon will be provided by the un-
manned lunar missions--Ranger, Surveyor, and Lunar
Orbiter--and that this information will confirm the
design criteria being established for the LEM.
Apollo plans are proceeding on the assumption that
these programs will be capable of providing all the
information needed for site selection.
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Altogether, we found that the present Apollo sched- 
ule is soundly conceived, compatible with economy, 
and in phase with the scientific and technological 
progress that will be needed to cope with the space 
environment. 
Some of the returns that the Nation obtains from 
J the Apollo investment are so well understood that 
they need be merely mentioned in passing. It is 
clear, for example, that the demonstration of the 
ability to conduct manned exploration of the Moon 
(fig. 7) will greatly increase United States prestige 
and influence in an area in which another nation has 
held the lead. It is equally clear that the exploration 
of the Moon expands human knowledge to a very 
large degree. And it is clear that the conduct of a 
program of research and develop.ment on the scale of 
Apollo contributes significantly to general technologi- 
cal advance in the form of new materials, methods, 
and processes, and in the resulting stimulus to the 
Nation's economic growth. 
Still another set of benefits from Apollo are the 
rapid advancement of United States capability in space 
and the ability to undertake whatever space activities 
the national interest may require. There are seven 
major elements in this capability-people, industrial 
base, ground facilities, launch vehicles, spacecraft, 
operational know-how, and the ability to manage re- 
search and development. Together, they add up to 
space power, which provides this Nation with free- 
dom of action in this new medium. 
First, and most important is people. W e  estimate 
that a quarter million people are now at work on 
manned space projects throughout the United States. 
Their numbers will increase to about 300,000 by next 
year, when the effort on the presently approved 
manned space flight program reaches its peak. 
FIGURE 7.-Manned exploration of the Moon. 
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At this maximum level, the team will include about 
45,000 scientists and engineers, about 2.8 percent of 
the total national employment of scientists and engi- 
neers. This number is substantial, of course, but it 
is clear that the requirements for manned space flight 
do not strain the national supply of highly qualified 
manpower. In fact, quite the opposite is the case. 
Industry has repeatedly informed us that it has avail- 
able the people to undertake additional efforts beyond 
those contemplated in the present programs. 
A second element of capability is the industrial team 
that has been assembled. Every region of the country 
is participating. In some areas, the work is focused 
in the NASA Centers and military installations; in 
others, prime contractors are prominent; in still others, 
subcontractors, supplier and vendors play the major 
role. The effort is truly national. 
Third are the giound installations needed to oper- 
ate in space. These include institutional, design and 
manufactwing, testing, launching, and operational fa- 
cilities in many parts of the United States, and the 
network of tracking stations around the world. 
Earlier in this session, Dr. Debus focused attention 
on the facilities of the Nation’s space port at Merritt 
Island, Fla. An extremely important item is the 
launch vehicle. The Saturn vehicles (fig. 8)  being 
developed in the Apollo program will make the 
United States second to none in this vital area. 
Dr. Rees pointed out the capabilities that these 
vehicles and the facilities for their production will 
provide to the country upon completion of the present 
program. 
Another element of capability is the Apollo space- 
craft, described by Dr. Shea, in which three astronauts 
will be able to navigate and maneuver, make rendez- 
FIGURE 8.-Satum vehicles for Apollo program. 
vous with other spacecraft, and remain in orbit for 
extended periods of time. The two-man LEM, the 
first U.S. spacecraft desigded wholly for operation 
beyond the Earth’s atmosphere, will provide us with 
the ability to carry on a number of experiments in 
earth orbit for the first time. Figures 9 and 10 show 
manned orbiting laboratory (MOL) and ferry system 
concepts. 
An extremely important dividend from the Apollo 
investment is experience and know-how in operations. 
W e  are learning what must be done on the ground 
and in flight; in vehicle assembly and automatic check- 
out; in launching space vehicles on time; in tracking 
and telemetering and transmitting vast quantities of 
information ; in calculating flight paths and mid- 
course maneuvers; in landing on another astronomical 
FIGURE 9.-Manned orbiting laboratory concepts 
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FIGURE lO.-Ferry systems. 
body and taking off without the assistance of a 
ground crew; in returning to the atmospheie at 7 
miles per second; in controlling the flight path through 
the atmosphere; and in returning to Earth on land 
or water. W e  are learning how to conduct such a 
mission, involving two spacecraft, at a distance up to 
a quarter-million miles from the earth. Figure 11 
is a typical Apollo mission profile for a lunar orbital 
rendezvous. 
FIGURE 11.-Typical profile of lunar orbital rendez- 
vous mode mission. 
Finally, in Apollo we are taking a long stride for- 
ward in the creation of the ability to manage a very 
large research and development effort. From the 
Manhattan Project of World War I1 to the ballistic 
missile programs of the 1950’s was one very large 
step. Now we have moved on to a program even 
more extensive in scope, managed at three locations 
under the overall direction of the Apollo Program 
Office in Washington. 
In this development of national capability-people, 
’ 
industry, facilities, launch vehicles, spacecraft, opera- &, 
tions, and management-NASA in the Apollo pro- 
gram is carrying forward the work begun a half 
century ago by its predecessor agency, the National 
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) . 
Like NACA, the space agency is concentrating its 
efforts on research and development. The only sig- 
nificant difference is that NASA also conducts opera- 
tions in space. Thus, we are developing the methods 
of operation in space as well as the needed technology. 
Many of the most significant advances in military 
and civil aviation resulted from fundamentals of flight 
developed by NACA. Frequently, this work was 
carried out with the sole objective of solving basic 
problems of flight. It did not wait for any statement 
of a specific military or civilian requirement. The 
requirements developed naturally after it became 
known what capabilities it was possible tu develop. 
In 1943, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox stated 
that the Navy’s World War  I1 fighter aircraft, the 
Corsair, Wildcat, and Hellcat, were possible only 
because they were based on such fundamentals de- 
veloped by NACA as wing sections, cooling meth- 
ods, and high-lift devices. “The great sea victories 
that have broken Japan’s expanding grip in the 
Pacific,” Secretary Knox said, “would not have been 
possible without the contributions of the NACA.” 
Last December, we saw the first major example of 
the application to military use of the manned space 
flight capability developed by NASA-the decision 
of the Department of Defense to use the Gemini 
hardware (fig. 12) and experience as the basis of its 
Manned Orbiting Laboratory program. The capability 
developed in Apollo will also be available if required 
to fill the needs of the Department of Defense. This 
national competence will serve the country long after 
the Apollo program has been completed. 
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In fact, fully 90 percent of the work now in prog- 
ress in Apollo would be done to create space power 
wen if there were no Moon and the program had an 
entirely different ultimate goal. In the Apollo pro- 
gram, the Moon is the focus of this great national 
effort to make the United States clearly first in space. 
It is a clear objective, toward which we find it pos- 
sible to organize the work in an effective, efficient 
manner, at a carefully coordinated rate. 
Apollo is an orderly program. Its momentum has 
been increasing steadily for almost 3 years. We will 
reach maximum effort next year. The funding pro- 
posals now before Congress will bring us halfway to 
the Moon. 
FIGURE 1 2 . 4 e m i n i  spacecraft No. 2 in systems test. With your support, we will arrive on schedule. 
